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Introduction
The design features of a product include attributes such as the
product's composition, size, shape, color, color combinations, graph-
ics, labels, and packaging.' Manufacturers use design features to ac-
complish various objectives. A design feature or combination of
design features may be desirable because it is essential to a product's
use or because it enhances the product's performance. A particular
design feature or combination of design features may also reduce the
cost of manufacturing a product, or it may add to the beauty, charm,
and overall appeal of a product. Finally, design features can also act
as source indicators by providing manufacturers with a means of dis-
tinguishing their products from their competitors'.
Using design features as a means of conveying information to
consumers about the source of a product has become an important
marketing tool for industry.2 The law has sought to accommodate the
efforts of these manufacturers by recognizing that a combination of
design features, which is either inherently distinctive or which has ac-
quired secondary meaning, is entitled to protection as trade dress
under the Lanham Act.3 Apart from the requirements of the Lanham
Act, the only further limitation on the protectability of design features
is that the combination of design features claimed as trade dress must
be non-functional.4
Drawing the line between functional and non-functional design
features is often an elusive and frustrating task. By definition, func-
tional means "of or relating to the special purpose for which some-
thing exists."5 As a starting point, it is therefore relevant to ask in
what ways design features relate to the special purposes for which
products exist. Common sense dictates, for example, that the shaft of
a lacrosse stick and the string on a bow are functional because they
are essential components of the product. Similarly, the layout of the
1. See, e.g., Nutrasweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613
(9th Cir. 1989); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1987).
2. Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
523, 526-31 (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1988); see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 774-76 (1992); Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994);
Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619, 620 (2d Cir.
1993); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 20 (7th Cir. 1992).
4. See, e.g., Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 6; Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger
Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir 1990), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 976 (1991); W.T. Rogers
Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 16-17 (1993).
5. WEBSTER'S II: NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 284,(1984).
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letters on a keyboard seems functional because it increases the effi-
ciency of the product. However, is the aluminum in a soft drink can
functional because it allows soft drink manufacturers to produce and
transport their products less expensively than if they used heavier and
more cumbersome materials such as glass? What if the manufacturers
could show that by using aluminum they are able to reduce the price
of their product?
From the earliest cases,6 the courts have struggled to define the
parameters of the concept of functionality with limited success. Their
failure is attributable in large measure to their approach, which has
been an attempt to define a point on an imaginary continuum where
design features stop functioning as indicators of source and begin
functioning as one of the features inherent to the product being sold.7
In an effort to provide further guidance, the Supreme Court recently
refined the principles underlying the functionality doctrine in Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc.8
This Article analyzes the Qualitex decision and then offers an ap-
proach for determining when design features are functional under the
Qualitex standard by drawing parallels between the economic princi-
ples behind the functionality doctrine and antitrust law.' Substantive
discussion begins in Part I with a brief overview of the economics of
trademark law. Part II introduces the concepts of mechanical and aes-
thetic functionality, traces their development in the lower courts, and
then discusses the. functionality standard established in Qualitex. In
Part III, the Article draws parallels between the functionality doctrine
as defined under Qualitex and the economic analysis frequently em-
ployed in antitrust litigation. Finally, in Part IV, the Article concludes
6. See, e.g., Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979,
981-82 (7th Cir. 1911); In re Dennison Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d 720, 720 (C.C.P.A. 1930); J.C.
Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941).
7. See Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995) (sug-
gesting that functionality should be considered along a continuum with unique arrange-
ments of purely functional features at one end, and distinctive and arbitrary arrangements
of predominantly ornamental features on the other end); Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup,
Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); see also Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull,
Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (drawing a distinction between de jure and de
facto functional features); In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("In
essence, de facto functional means that the design of a product has a function, i.e., a bottle
of any design holds fluid. De jure functionality, on the other hand, means that the product
is in its particular shape because it works better in this shape.").
8. _ U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
9. I am not the first author to find the analysis used in antitrust cases relevant to
trademark issues. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-
on-Competition Test, 51 CiI. L. REv. 868 (1984); Diana E. Pinover, Aesthetic Functionality:
The Need for a Foreclosure of Competition, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 571 (1993).
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by suggesting that courts recognize the convergence of functionality
doctrine analysis and standard antitrust analysis.
I
Trademark Economics °
Trademarks and trade dress are valued in society because they
"reduce the costs of information to consumers by making it easy for
them to identify the products or producers with which they have had
either good experiences, so that they want to keep buying the product
(or buying from the producer), or bad experiences, so that they want
to avoid the product or the producer in the future."'1 To ensure that
consumers enjoy the benefits of trademark and trade dress protection,
the Lanham Act makes it unlawful for firms to adopt trademarks or
trade dress so similar to those of other firms that their concurrent use
would likely confuse, mislead, or deceive consumers as to the true
source of the goods. 2 This protection reduces the likelihood that
free-riding competitors will attempt to capture profits by passing their
goods off as those marketed by the owner of the mark or trade dress.'
3
Trademark and trade dress owners therefore have an incentive to
maintain and improve the quality of their products. 4
Since manufacturers can choose from nearly an infinite number
of names, symbols, and design features by which to distinguish their
own products, it is widely accepted that granting them the exclusive
right to market their products under a particular name or combination
of design features does not normally hinder the ability of potential
competitors to enter a product market.' 5 However, the existence of
10. For an in-depth discussion of the economic principles underlying trademark law,
see generally Economides, supra note 2; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988) [hereinafter Landes &
Posner (I)]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
11. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Scandia Down
Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147
(1986)).
12. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresege Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) ("The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological func-
tion of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase
goods by them."). For useful background, see Landes & Posner (I), supra note 10, at 270-
71; Economides, supra note 2, at 524.
13. See Landes & Posner (I), supra note 10, at 270-72.
14. Id. at 271.
15. W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 338-39; In re DC Comics Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring). But see, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632,
648-51 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the protection of product con-
figurations essentially grants design patent protection for an indefinite term).
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effective competition in a trademark system presupposes that trade-
mark protection will be granted only to those words and designs capa-
ble of acting as a source indicator.16 The courts have thus fashioned
various safeguards to distinguish between words and design features
capable of acting as source indicators and those that are not.
One safeguard is the well-established prohibition against the re-
gistration or protection of generic words.17 Under the generic word
doctrine, commonly-used words that describe a product cannot be ap-
propriated as trademarks for that product. 8 The doctrine also re-
vokes trademark protection for marks that lose their significance as
source indicators because they have been adopted by the public as the
generic word for the product. 9 In the absence of the doctrine, the
owner of the generic word for a product could prevent other manufac-
turers from identifying their products to consumers. 20 As a result, the
trademark owner would receive rents either in the form of licensing
fees or added costs to competing manufacturers, who would have to
find alternative ways of describing their products. 2 ' Although the
value of the rents would not necessarily force firms out of the relevant
product market, the rents would nevertheless reduce the "competitive
effectiveness" of such firms.22 Moreover, consumers would suffer a
corresponding welfare loss because the absence of clear indicators
would increase the likelihood that consumers will at least occasionally
purchase a product in the mistaken belief that it is something else.23
Similar concerns underlie the functionality doctrine. Like words
or symbols, design features capable of identifying and distinguishing a
firm's products from the products of other manufacturers are not in
short supply.24 However, some design features are necessary compo-
nents of the product being marketed and therefore cannot act as
source indicators. 25 For example:
[A] football's oval shape is "functional" in the following practical
sense: it would be found in all or most brands of the product even if
16. King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963).
17. See, e.g., id. at 579; Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir. 1936).
18. See, e.g., Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
19. See Landes & Posner (I), supra note 10, at 291-94.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 290.
22. Id. at 290-91.
23. Some consumer goods, like airplanes and automobiles, could be easily identified
by sight. In the absence of any identifying features, other products, such as pharmaceuti-
cals, could only be identified through trial and error. Id. at 293-94.
24. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1985).
25. See id.
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no producer had any desire to have his brand mistaken for that of
another producer. A feature functional in this sense-a feature that
different brands share rather than a feature designed to differentiate
the brands-is unlike those dispensable features of the particular
brand that, like an arbitrary identifying name, rivals do not need in
order to compete effectively.
26
Allowing a manufacturer to exercise monopoly control over func-
tional design features would therefore be the economic and legal
equivalent of granting the manufacturer a patent on a product for an
indeterminate period of time.27 Other firms would be precluded from
competing in the same product market as the firm that already has a
property right in the design features.21 Put slightly differently, a func-
tional feature does not qualify for trademark protection because it
does not serve the identifying purpose for which trademarks were
designed. 9 Rather, the design feature is part of the product and will
be associated by consumers as one of the attributes for which they are
searching.3 °
II
Formulations of the Functionality Doctrine
The functionality doctrine received little attention from the
United States Supreme Court prior to its 1995 unanimous decision in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co. 31 In fact, the Court's only gui-
dance had been offered in dictum and limited to the observation that
something is functional when "it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article. '32 Accord-
26. Id. at 339:
27. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, .1246 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d
Cir. 1983); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The purpose of the rule
precluding trademark significance for functional features is to prevent the grant of a per-
petual monopoly to features which cannot be patented."); Pope Automatic Merchandising
Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1911). Patent protection is avail-
able for both the design and utility elements of a product that meets the statutory qualify-
ing requirements. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-104, 171-173 (1995). Once a patent is issued, the
patentee retains the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the patented feature. This statu-
tory monopoly lasts for a period of 20 years in the case of utility patents and 14 years when
a design patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 173 (1988 & Supp. 1995).
28. Landes & Posner (I), supra note 10, at 296-97.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
32. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); see.also id. at
863 (White, J., concurring); cf Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938)
(holding that the shape of Nabisco's shredded wheat biscuit could not be protected under a
likelihood of confusion rationale because their "form [was] functional" in that the "cost of
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ingly, the lower courts were left on their own to devise legal standards
for determining when a design feature is functional. Their efforts led
to general agreement on three points: (1) in determining functionality,
design features should not be dissected but, instead, considered in
their entirety;33 (2) the functionality doctrine is designed to prevent
manufacturers from obtaining product monopolies;34 and (3) a deter-
mination of functionality entails consideration of the competitive ef-
fects of protecting the design features at issue.35  Despite their
agreement on these points, the lower courts have been unable to
agree on such issues as who bears the burden of proof when a func-
tionality issue is raised.36 More significantly, the lower courts have
been unable to adopt a single standard for determining when a partic-
ular combination of design features stops functioning as a source indi-
cator and begins functioning as part of the product.37 The inability of
the lower courts to agree on a single standard can be attributed in part
to the analytical distinctions made in some circuits' between applica-
tion of the functionality doctrine to "utilitarian" design features and
application of the functionality doctrine to "aesthetic" design
features.38
A. Mechanical Functionality
Traditionally, when courts have been confronted with design fea-
tures thought to be essential to the efficient operation or production
the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were substi-
tuted for the pillow shape.").
33. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's Bros., Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987);
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart, Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985).
34. See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 977.
36. Compare Merchants & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628,633
(3d Cir. 1992) (trademark owner bears burden of proving mark non-functional) and
Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987) (same) with Computer
Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleged infringer bears
burden of proving functionality) and LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 (same); see also Taco Ca-
bana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc. 932 F.2d 1113, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1991), affd, 505 U.S. 763
(1992).
37. For examples of diverging standards among the circuits, compare Warner Bros.,
Inc. V. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that where mark only
indicates source its aesthetic functionality does not preclude a finding of nonfunctionality)
and The Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1993) (same) (citing
Ferrari S.P.A. Escercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1219 (1992)) with International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindedburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) (holding insignia of fraternal
organization unprotectable as a trademark when no one is confused that the jewelry is
made or licensed by the organization).
38. See infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text.
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of a product, they have described the question before them as one
involving "utilitarian" or "mechanical" functionality.39 The concept
of mechanical functionality has been defined in a multitude of ways.
Consider, for example, the following formulations of the doctrine:
The essence of the question [of functionality] is whether a particular
feature of a product or service is substantially related to its value as
a product or service, i.e., if the feature is part of the "function"
served, or whether the primary value of a particular feature is the
identification of the provider.
4
Q
[T]rade dress is nonfunctional if it is an arbitrary embellishment pri-
marily adopted for purposes of identification and individuality. But
if the trade dress is an important ingredient in the commercial suc-
cess of the product, it is clearly functional.4 '
If the design of a product or a container for a product is so utilita-
rian as to constitute a superior design which others in the field need
to be able to copy in order to compete effectively, it is de jure func-
tional (functional in law), and, as such, precluded from registration
for reasons of public policy.
42
It should suffice for a finding of functionality if protecting the trade
dress threatens to eliminate a substantial swath of the competitive
alternatives in the relevant market.
43
Common among these widely recognized definitions of mechanical
functionality is that each discusses functionality in light of competi-
tion. Also common, unfortunately, is the imprecise use of language
and a lack of direction of how to determine when a combination of
design features is functional. In response to the increasing confusion,
several courts have recently sought to refine their analysis. The lead-
ing case of the reform movement is In re Morton-Norwich Products,
Inc. 44
In Morton-Norwich, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed the Patent and Trademark Office's determination that a
container configuration was functional and could not be registered as
a trademark.4 5 The court began its discussion by noting that most de-
sign features are utilitarian in the sense that they are directed at a
function:4
6
39. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338-40 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
40. Standard Terry Mill, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 1986) (quot-
ing United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1984)).
41. Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986)).
42. In re Weber-Stephen Prods. Co., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659, 1664 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
43. Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 n.6 (5th Cir. 1991), affd,
505 U.S. 763 (1992).
44. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see also Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull, Ltd., 35
F.3d 1527, 1530-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
45. Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1334.
46. Id. at 1338.
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We have refrained from using phrases such as "essentially func-
tional," "primarily functional," and "dictated primarily by func-
tional considerations" to denote the legal consequence, -all of which
use the word "functional" in the lay sense of the term. If. in the
legal sense, a particular design is functional, such adverbs as "essen-
tially" and "primarily" are without meaning. Either a design is
function (de jure) or it is not.47
Therefore, the issue, in the court's view, was not whether a combina-
tion of design features had utility, but the degree of utility provided by
the design features.4
Ultimately, the court found that only those design features which
were "superior," in the sense that manufacturers needed to copy them
in order to be able to compete effectively, could properly be consid-
ered functional.49 According to the court, evidence relevant to this
determination included: (1) whether the design features had been pat-
ented; (2) whether the manufacturer touted the utilitarian advantages
of the design in its advertising; (3) whether there were equivalent al-
ternatives to the design features; and (4) whether the design features
resulted from a simple, cheap method of manufacturing the product.
50
Finding that the utilitarian functions of the container configuration
could be accomplished in a variety of ways, the court held that pro-
tecting the product configuration as trade dress would not hinder
competition and was therefore non-functional.5'
Although providing much needed insight into the issue, the Mor-
ton-Norwich court's method for determining functionality is subject to
criticism on the grounds that the evidence it cited as relevant to a
determination of functionality would be insufficient to support such a
finding. In many cases, evidence that a particular design feature is
one of few alternatives, cheaper to manufacture, patentable, or touted
as utilitarian may prove very little beyond the inference that the de-
sign features have certain advantages over other design features. The
functionality doctrine requires something more-namely, that depriv-
ing other firms of the ability to copy the design features would have a
materially adverse impact on the ability of those firms to compete.
Accordingly, the Morton-Norwich court should have required not
only evidence of utilitarian advantages, but also evidence indicating
that the cost of using other design features would increase the price of
the product above what it would have been had the design features
been used, or that consumers or retailers so prefer the design features
47. Id. at 1343 n.4.
48. Id. at 1343.
49. Id. at 1339-40.
50. Id. at 1340-41.
51. 1& at 1341-42.
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claimed as functional that they will not purchase the product without
them.
This approach Was adopted in Abbott Laboratories v. Mead John-
son & Co.52 In Abbott Laboratories, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the functionality determination of a district court when
it failed to consider evidence beyond that suggested in Morton-Nor-
wich. At issue in the case was whether translucent, square, quart-
sized plastic bottles were functional when used as containers for oral
electrolyte' maintenance solutions.- The district court held that the bot-
tles were functional because they were "easier to ship and package,"
took up less space on a shelf than comparable containers, and were
"more easily handled by consumers."53 The appellate court disagreed.
In its view, assuming that the district court's findings were correct, the
functionality doctrine additionally required that it also be proven that
a monopoly on the utilitarian advantages would negatively and mate-
rially impact the ability of other firms to compete effectively in the
product market for oral electrolyte maintenance solutions.54 To aid
the district court on remand, the appellate court posed three ques-
tions: (1) Do the design advantages impact the retail price of the prod-
uct?; (2) Would retailers hesitate to display the product without the
design features?; and (3) Do consumers so prefer the design features
that they would "eschew" the same product if packaged in a different
container?55 With these questions, the Seventh Circuit cast the issue
of mechanical functionality in terms of competition. The decision did
little, however, to resolve the confusion engendered by the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality.
B. Aesthetic Functionality
The doctrine of aesthetic functionality is concerned with whether
the ornamental design features of a product are necessary for effective
competition. Like its counterpart, aesthetic functionality has been ar-
ticulated in a variety of ways. The broadest statement of the doctrine
was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.56
In Pagliero, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether
four design patterns of hotel china were functional.57 In analyzing the
functionality defense, the court divided design features into two cate-
52. 971 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 20-21.
54. lId at 21.
55. Id.
56. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
57. Id at 343.
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gories: (1) design features that are "an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product," and (2) design features that are
arbitrary and "primarily adopted for purposes of identification and
individuality. '5 8 The court then held that since the patterns on china
were intended to make the product more attractive and were not pri-
marily designed to act as source indicators, they were functional.59 In
the court's judgment, the ability to copy ornamental design features,
which were proven to be important to consumers, was necessary to
avoid giving the originator of the design a,.competitive advantage in
the market.60
Subsequent courts received the Pagliero decision, together with
the notion that purely aesthetic features can in themselves confer utili-
tarian functionality on a proposed mark, with mixed reaction.6 1 Those
courts that condemned the "important ingredient" test argued that
Pagliero suffered on three counts. First, the important ingredient test
was criticized for its failure to recognize that the ability of a design
feature to serve as a source indicator is enhanced when it is also
designed to make the product more attractive.62 Moreover, the test
failed to recognize that "trade dress associated with. a product that has
accumulated goodwill ... will almost always be an important ingredi-
ent in the salability of a product." 63 However, the most serious objec-
tion to the important ingredient test was that "by allowing the copying
of an exact design without any evidence of market foreclosure, the
Pagliero test [discouraged] both originators and later competitors
from developing pleasing designs."' The absence of an incentive to
develop innovative designs, according to many courts, would have the
unintended effect of hindering rather than enhancing competition and
product development. Despite the overwhelming criticism of Pag-
liero, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality has remained a viable con-
cept in some circuits, though in modified form.In Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc. ,65 for example, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that aesthetic functionality
should be similarly restricted as mechanical functionality by focusing
58. Id.
59. Id. at 343-44.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245-46 (6th Cir.
1991); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J.
Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981).
62. Roberts, 944 F.2d at 1246-47 (citations omitted).
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916.F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir.
1990).
65. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
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on the extent to which an aesthetic design feature is related to the
utilitarian function of the product.66 The court in Paraflex then up-
held the finding by a district court that the shape of an outdoor light-
ing fixture was functional because it was one of only twelve or fifteen
shapes by which the product could be made and still be compatible
with the structures to which the product was attached.67 In so doing,
the court rejected the plaintiff's complaint that the district court had
erred by failing to explicitly find that competition would be substan-
tially hindered by restricting the copying of its design.68 Rather, the
court wrote that "[b]ecause there are only a limited number of con-
figurations ... [for the product] which are architecturally compatible
with the type of structures on which they are placed, the selection of
[the product] design does not have the unlimited boundaries as does
the selection of a wine bottle or ashtray design."69 Other courts, while
not explicitly adopting the Third Circuit's notion of decor compatibil-
ity,70 have similarly held that "where an ornamental feature is claimed
as a trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder
competition by limiting the range of adequate design alternatives, the
aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection."'71
A second line of decisions rejected the concept of aesthetic func-
tionality altogether.72 In the view of these courts, drawing a distinc-
tion between aesthetic and mechanical functionality was unnecessary
and potentially confusing since the question posed by the functionality
doctrine is the same whether the design feature is claimed to be orna-
mental or utilitarian: Do competitors have to incorporate the feature
sought to be protected in their products in order to compete effec-
tively in the market?
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this view when
asked to consider whether the hexagonal shape of office stacking trays
is functional:
A feature can be functional not only because it helps a product
achieve the objective for which the product would be valued by a
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id. at 826-27.
68. Id. at 827.
69. Id. at 830.
70. The concept of decor compatibility is related to the color depletion theory, which
holds that allowing colors to be used as trademarks will deplete the supply of usable colors,
placing competitors at a competitive disadvantage. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305-06 (1995); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull
Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
71. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir.
1990); see also In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
72. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp., 35 F.3d at 1532-33.
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person indifferent to matters of taste, charm, elegance, and beauty,
but also because it makes the product more pleasing to people not
indifferent to such things. But the fact that people like the feature
does not by itself prevent the manufacturer from being able to use it
as his trademark. He is prevented only if the feature is functional
... that is only if without it other producers of the product could not
compete effectively.73
Although rejecting aesthetic functionality as a doctrine, the effective
impact of the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit was similar to
that taken by courts accepting the doctrine in its modified form. This
is because both views return the focus to the likely competitive effect
of not allowing the design features to be copied, and away from
whether a particular combination of design features has accumulated
good will among consumers.
C. The Qualitex Standard of Functionality
In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.," the Supreme Court
was asked to consider whether colors are registrable as trademarks
under the Lanham Act. The plaintiff, Qualitex, manufactured press
pads used in dry cleaning and laundry establishments.75 Since the
1950s, Qualitex had always dyed its press pads a special shade of
green-gold.76 When one of its competitors began using the same
green-gold color on its own press pads, Qualitex filed a trademark
infringement and unfair competition action, alleging that the competi-
tor was attempting to pawn off its press pads as Qualitex pads. 77 After
determining that the Lanham Act did not specifically prohibit the re-
gistration of colors as trademarks and that colors were capable of act-
ing as trademarks, the Court considered whether the functionality
doctrine posed an impediment to trademark protection.78
The functionality doctrine, according to the Court, "forbids the
use of a product's feature as a trademark where doing so will put a
competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is 'essen-
tial to the use or purpose of the article' or 'affects its cost or qual-
ity.' 79 . The Court further explained that the functionality doctrine
"thus protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recog-
nition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise im-
73. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985).
74. __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
75. Id. at 1302.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1302-04.
79. Id. at 1306 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)).
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pose, namely their inability reasonably to replicate important non-
reputation-related product features."8 According to the Court, while
instances may arise where a certain color is functional when applied to
a particular product, the courts will have to determine whether its use
as a trademark would permit one competitor to interfere with compe-
tition on a case by case basis.81 When the use of a color as a trade-
mark does not interfere with non-trademark related competition, it is
entitled to protection under the Lanham Act.82
The Court's opinion thus clarifies that the considerations relevant
to functionality do not depend on whether the feature is classified as
an aesthetic or utilitarian design feature. Indeed, the Court wrote
that, like its counterpart, the ultimate test of aesthetic functionality
"'is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly
hinder competition.' "83 This formulation mirrors the general stan-
dards adopted by the courts of the reform movement. However, strik-
ingly absent from the decision is an explanation of how to determine
when a feature is "'essential to the use or purpose of the article'.or
'affects its cost or quality."'"
III
Antitrust and Functionality Parallels
While Qualitex failed to provide lower courts with significant in-
sight into the considerations relevant to determining when a design
feature is functional, its formulation of the functionality doctrine sug-
gests a starting point for the application of antitrust principles in func-
tionality analysis. The following section explains two basic concepts
of antitrust analysis: market power and market definition. It then ex-
amines how these concepts are relevant to functionality analysis.
A. Market Power
The underlying policy of the antitrust laws is to ensure that con-
sumers receive the benefits of a competitive market.85 It is widely
believed that one of the primary benefits of competition is that it




83. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995)).
84. Id.
85. For a general discussion of the principles underlying antitrust law, see ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); PHILLIP
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 501, at 322 (1978).
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reflect their lowest marginal costs. 86 In a monopoly setting, on the
other hand, the absence of competitors is thought to provide firms
with an incentive to maximize their profits by restricting output and
setting their prices above marginal costs. 87 Whenever a firm has the
ability to raise prices above its marginal costs in spite of competition,
that firm is typically said to have market power.88 If a firm can use its
market power to raise prices for a sustained period of time, the firm is
then said to possess monopoly power.
Identifying the presence of market power is an inexact process. 89
In antitrust cases, courts generally infer the existence or absence of
market power by measuring the concentration of firms within a de-
fined market. The most widely followed method of measuring con-
centration is the market share test used in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America (Alcoa).90 Under Alcoa, when the market share of an
alleged monopolist is calculated, if it represents less than 33% of the
market, monopoly power is assumed not to exist.91 On the other
hand, if the firm holds 90% of the market shares for a particular prod-
uct, the firm is presumed to have monopoly power.92 Alcoa desig-
nated a 64% market share as the middle ground where whether
monopoly power exists depends on what the firm's conduct reveals. 93
More sophisticated methods of measuring concentration and competi-
tiveness, namely the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, have also been
proposed and are sometimes employed in antitrust analysis to supple-
ment the Alcoa market share test.9
4
However, before concentration and competitiveness can be mea-
sured under Alcoa or any other market power test, it is necessary to
define the relevant market over which the exercise of monopoly
power is possible. Indeed, without an appropriate market definition,
there is no backdrop against which to measure economic power.95
86. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433-34 & n.4 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) (cita-
tions omitted).
89. See id. at 966 (quoting United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986
F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993)).
90. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
91. Id. at 424.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. For an analysis of alternate methods of measuring concentration, see FREDERIC M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 56-80 (2d ed.
1980).




The threshold requirement of defining the relevant market is a
two-part inquiry, which seeks to delineate the geographical and prod-
uct parameters of the area of effective competition.9 6 The test for de-
termining the relevant geographic market is the geographical area "in
which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably
turn for supplies."97 The boundaries of a product market, on the
other hand, are determined by eliminating from the market all prod-
ucts that are not reasonably interchangeable substitutes for the prod-
uct manufactured or sold by the alleged monopolist. 8 Products are
"reasonably interchangeable" only if they compete with one another.
In other words, defining a product market is the process of identifying
those products which, because of their similarities, have the ability-
actual or potential-to take significant amounts of business away from
one another.99 This process is undertaken by examining the cross-
elasticity of demand between two products.
Cross-elasticity of demand is defined as the degree to which buy-
ers will substitute one product for another in the event of a significant
and sustained price increase. 100 Data specifically measuring consumer
sensitivity to price changes provides the most reliable measure of
cross-elasticity of demand. However, such data is difficult to gather
and the courts often rely on other evidence as proxies for cross-elastic-
ity data. 10 1 For example, because product substitutes typically share a
strong physical and functional relationship, measuring elasticity can be
accomplished in a rudimentary way by simply comparing the physical
qualities and end-uses of a product and proposed alternative.0
96. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir.
1986):
To define a market in product and geographic terms is to say that if prices were
appreciably raised or volume appreciably curtailed for the product within a given
area, while demand held constant, supply from other sources could not be ex-
pected to enter promptly enough and in large enough amounts to restore the old
price and volume.
(quoting LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 12, at 41 (1977)).
97. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 321, 327-28 (1961); see also FTC v.
Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A market is the set of sellers to
which a set of buyers can turn for supplies at existing or slightly higher prices.").
98. United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
99. See General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 805 (8th Cir.
1987).
100. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 351. U.S. 377.
101. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962); United States Health-
care, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993); U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule
Indus., 7 F.3d 986, 995 (11th Cir. 1993).
102. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 18:569
UTILITARIAN DESIGN FEATURES AND ANTITRUST PARALLELS
When two products share common physical qualities and uses, elastic-
ity is high because consumers can freely shift from one product to the
other to satisfy their desires. On the other hand, when a product has a
distinct quality, characteristic, or end-use specifically desired by con-
sumers, but which cannot be found in a proposed alternative, the pro-
posed alternative will not be viewed by consumers as an adequate
substitute for the product. Under these circumstances, elasticity is low
because consumers will purchase the product even if the proposed al-
ternative is made significantly cheaper due to a price increase in the
product. Other surrogates for elasticity data include industry and
public perceptions of the boundaries of the product market, consumer
usage patterns, cross-industry price monitoring, as well as the pres-
ence or absence of a distinct customer base and specialized vendors.10 3
C. Application of Antitrust Analysis to the Defense of Functionality
The process of measuring market concentration and defining
markets allows courts faced with antitrust issues to examine competi-
tive conditions in the marketplace. Like the antitrust laws, the func-
tionality doctrine is also concerned with competition in the
marketplace. Not surprisingly, therefore, the analytical tools em-
ployed in antitrust cases are equally capable of assisting courts in
resolving functionality issues.
Under Qualitex, the functionality doctrine prohibits trade dress
protection for design features when the protection would put competi-
tors at a significant disadvantage because the design feature "is essen-
tial to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost or quality of
the product." 104 To determine whether protecting design features
would put competitors at a significant disadvantage, a court must pre-
dict the probable effect that granting such protection will have on the
marketplace. As in antitrust cases, this inquiry requires that the court
begin its analysis by defining the market. Because the Lanham Act
provides national protection to trade dress owners, the relevant geo-
graphic market will always be the United States. The product market,
on the other hand, must be defined by determining what products are
reasonably interchangeable with the product to which the design fea-
ture sought to be protected has been attached. After the market has
been defined, the court can then assess whether trade dress protection
will adversely impact competition by measuring the probable effect
trade dress protection will have on market concentration. If trade
103. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599; U.S. Anchor Mfg., 7 F.3d at 995.
104. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., Inc., _ U.S. _ 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (1995)
(quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
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dress protection would allow the trade dress owner to increase its
market share at the expense of competitors, the design feature should
be considered functional if the trade dress owner's success is unrelated
to recognition or reputation.
For example, imagine a case in which a manufacturer of footballs
asserted trade dress rights over the oval shape of its product. To de-
termine whether the oval shape of a football is functional, a court
would begin its analysis by excluding all products not reasonably in-
terchangeable in use with footballs. Since the rules of the gameof
football require that the game be played with a ball that is oval in
shape, athletic balls with round shapes are not reasonably inter-
changeable in use with footballs. The relevant product market would
therefore be composed only of oval-shaped balls. Because all the
products in the relevant market share the design feature sought to be
protected, granting trade dress protection to the manufacturer would
be equivalent to granting a product monopoly to the manufacturer.
Under these circumstances, trade dress protection would certainly
lead to increased concentration in the market, since the trade dress
proprietor could prohibit its competitors from making footballs. The
court would therefore be expected to hold that the oval shape of a
football is functional.
Measuring cross-elasticity of demand to define the product mar-
ket works equally as well when the design feature at issue is not essen-
tial to a product's use, but rather is primarily ornamental. For
example, suppose a manufacturer of coats sought trade dress protec-
tion on the use of animal fur on coats because he was well-known for
making fur coats. The manufacturer might attempt to distinguish his
case from the manufacturer who sought trade dress protection on the
oval shape of footballs by arguing that coats can be made of out of any
number of fabrics and that extending trade dress protection to fur
would not prohibit competitors from manufacturing coats or jackets.
However, the distinctive price of fur coats and the willingness of con-
sumers to purchase fur coats despite cheaper, available alternatives
suggests that fur coats are not reasonably interchangeable with coats
made of other material. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
fur coats are generally sold by vendors specializing in the sale of fur
coats. Cross-elasticity of demand evidence would likely also reveal
that fur coats are luxury items purchased primarily for status. Under
these circumstances, fur coats arguably constitute a distinct product
market. Because all products within the relevant product market
would share the common design feature of being made from fur,
granting trade dress protection on that design feature would lead to a
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product monopoly and increased concentration in the marketplace,
results prohibited under Qualitex. A court would therefore be ex-
pected to hold that fur is a functional design feature of coats.
However, in most cases, when a court defines a product market, it
will discover that the product having the design feature sought to be
protected competes with other products that do not have the design
feature. Qualitex teaches, however, that a design feature is functional
even if the effect of granting trade dress protection would not be
equivalent to granting a product monopoly. Rather, trade dress pro-
tection is prohibited whenever granting the exclusive right to use a
design feature would give the trade dress owner a significant advan-
tage over other manufacturers by prohibiting them from copying im-
portant non-reputation-related product features.
When trade dress protection does not result in a product monop-
oly, the court should predict the probable effect of such protection on
market concentration by examining the impact protection will have on
cross-elasticity of demand. When trade dress protection would lower
elasticity between products having the design feature and other prod-
ucts moving in the same market, a court should infer that trade dress
protection will lead to increased market concentration. For example,
if a manufacturer can manufacture its product for a lesser cost than its
competitors because it gains protection for a cost-effective design fea-
ture on that product, the manufacturer can sell the product at a price
which is higher than it could if its competitors could utilize that pro-
tected design feature, and still undercut its competitors' prices for al-
ternative products. Thus, even though consumers would pay a higher
price for the product with the design feature than they would if the
manufacturer's competitors could compete using the cost-effective de-
sign, the consumers would have no incentive to switch to the competi-
tors' alternative products, because the price of the product with the
design feature would be cheaper than the alternatives. The same ef-
fect would follow when consumers desire the product having the de-
sign feature sought to be protected because the design feature
improves the performance or quality of the product. On the other
hand, when consumers desire a design feature only for reputational
reasons, cross-elasticity of demand would presumably remain un-
changed. That is, consumers would be expected to switch to the less
pleasing alternative in the event of a significant and sustained price
increase in the same degree as they would have prior to the granting
of trade dress protection.
It should also be noted that using cross-elasticity evidence to pre-
dict the probable effect of trade dress protection on market concentra-
1996]
tion alleviates any necessity to specify the smallest projected market-
share increase that would raise an inference of functionality. Indeed,
increases in market share, with nothing more, do not suggest function-
ality at all. To the contrary, a court must be able to attribute probable
market-share increases to the nonreputational advantages of the de-
sign feature before the design feature may be considered functional.
Relying on cross-elasticity data eliminates from the equation market-
share increases attributable to the good-will advantages of a design
feature. As such, any measurable increase in market concentration
attributable to shifts in elasticity arising from trade dress protection
would amount to a "significant disadvantage" for competitors.
To date, the courts have never formally undertaken the process of
defining the relevant market and measuring the probable effect that
trade dress protection would have on market concentration when
faced with a functionality issue. However, several courts have taken
steps toward that end. For example, to resolve the functionality issue
raised in Abbott Laboratories, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit defined the relevant product market (albeit arbitrarily) and
remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether the design
feature sought to be protected was either demanded by consumers
and retailers or whether the feature allowed the product to be mar-
keted at a lower cost.1"5 Although the Seventh Circuit did not specifi-
cally instruct the lower court to consider the impact of protecting the
design features on market concentration, the questions posed by the
Seventh Circuit are proxies for cross-elasticity data and were asked
because of their ability to assist the lower court in predicting the prob-




In its review of the functionality doctrine, the discussion has from
time to time pointed out that many difficulties result from the impre-
cise use of language and the absence of a single standard to ascertain
whether a particular combination of design features is functional. In
searching for a standard which could yield consistent results, courts
have increasingly turned to the underlying policy of the doctrine,
which is to protect competition. By framing the issue in terms of com-
petition, it is a natural progression to turn to the principles of the anti-
trust laws, where the competitive effects of firm conduct have been
105. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 8-9 (7th Cir. 1992).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:569
1996] UTILITARIAN DESIGN FEATURES AND ANTITRUST PARALLELS 589
more fully explored. More importantly, framing the question in terms
of competition shows that the distinction currently made in some
courts between mechanical and aesthetic functionality is unnecessary.
Such a distinction confuses the primary question: by receiving a mo-
nopoly on the design features, will the proprietor of the trade dress
receive an undue competitive advantage in the marketplace? This can
most easily be determined by: (1) defining the product market, and (2)
examining whether the probable effect of granting trade dress protec-
tion would be to increase firm concentration within the market.

